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Abortion 1NC
T – Persons Living in Poverty
  1. Definitions – Poverty is defined by the Federal Poverty Line
OCPP, Oregon Center for Public Policy, 09
OCPP, Oregon Center for Public Policy, “Federal Government Issues New Poverty Line for 2009,” January 23, 2009, __ display.cgi?page= nr20090123Povert__ [Tom]

The 2009 Federal Poverty Income Guidelines, published in today’s Federal Register, set the definition of poverty that Oregon uses to determine eligibility for programs such as child care subsidies, Head Start, food stamps, school lunches, energy assistance and some health care programs. The poverty guidelines vary by family size. This year, for example, a family of three with an annual income of $18,310 or under qualifies as poor, up from $17,600 in 2008. A four-person family would be poor if their annual income is $22,050 or less.

For declares the targets of social services
Cambridge Dictionary, 2k
Cambridge University Press p.334

For – prep. Intended to be given to; having to purpose of because of, as a result of (doing something); instead of, to help; considering (something or someone with reference to things or people as the usually are); in support or relation to (someone or something); in support of or agreement with

  1. Violation – the affirmative never verifies in their plan text that their services are going to ‘persons living in poverty’ meaning the people living with an annual income under the federally defined poverty line. They only overturn a court ruling banning funds for abortion in Medicaid.
  2. Standards
    1. Limits – failure to limit eligibility to persons in poverty explodes the topic – every government policy affects persons in poverty, it’s a question of exclusivity
    2. Ground – universal counterplans and criticisms of the federal poverty line are core negative ground
3. Extra-T – we can’t predict what other groups of people they’ll offer their social service to – makes it impossible to prepare
4. Contextuality – our definition of poverty is the most predictable because it’s defined by the resolutional actor – when the USfg enacts poverty policies, this is the definition they turn to

Capitalism K
  1. Link – Social services legitimize capitalism – this turns case by recreating the labor force and replacing one social problem with many others.
Hall, prof @ University College London, 89
Peter Hall Prof. Planning and Regeneration at The Bartlett, University College London. 1989. Cities of Tomorrow. Pgs. 335-341

At the same time, a specifically Marxian view of planning emerged in the English-speaking world. To describe it adequately would require a course in Marxist theory. But, in inadequate summary, it states that the structure of the capitalist city itself, including its land-use and activity patterns, is the result of capital in pursuit of profit. Because capitalism is doomed to recurrent crises, which deepen in the current stage of late capitalism, capital calls upon the state, as its agent, to assist it by remedying disorganization in commodity production, and by aiding the reproduction of the labour force. It thus tries to achieve certain necessary objectives: to facilitate continued capital accumulation, by ensuring rational allocation of resources; by assisting the reproduction of the labour force through the provision of social services, thus maintaining a delicate balance between labour and capital and preventing social disintegration; and by guaranteeing and legitimating capitalist social and property relations. As Dear and Scott put it: 'In summary, planning is an historically-specific and socially-necessary response to the self-disorganizing tendencies of privatized capitalist social and property relations as these appear in urban space.'° In particular, it seeks to guarantee collective provision of necessary infrastructure and certain basic urban services, and to reduce negative externalities whereby certain activities of capital cause losses to other parts of the system.59 But, since capitalism also wishes to circumscribe state planning as far as possible, there is an inbuilt contradiction: planning, because of this inherent inadequacy, always solves one problem only by creating another.60 Thus, say the Marxists, nineteenth-century clearances in Paris created a working-class housing problem; American zoning limited the powers of industrialists to locate at the most profitable locations." And planning can never do more than modify some parameters of the land development process; it cannot change its intrinsic logic, and so cannot remove the contradiction between private accumulation and collective action." Further, the *capitalist class is by no means homogenous; different fractions of capital may have divergent, even contradictory interests, and complex alliances may be formed in consequence; thus, latter-day Marxist explanations come close to being pluralist, albeit with a strong structural element.' But in the process, 'the more that the State intervenes in the urban system, the greater is the likelihood that different social groups and fractions will contest the legitimacy of its decisions. Urban life as a whole becomes progressively invaded by political controversies and dilemmas'.

  1. Impact – Capitalism’s drive for material makes crisis and extinction inevitable.

Meszaros, prof Philosophy & Political Theory, 95
Istvan Meszaros, 1995, Professor at University of Sussex, England, “Beyond Capital: Toward a Theory of Transition”

With regard to its innermost determination the capital system is expansion oriented and accumulation-driven. Such a determination constitutes both a formerly unimaginable dynamism and a fateful deficiency. In this sense, as a system of social metabolic control capital is quite irresistible for as long as it can successfully extract and accumulate surplus-labour-whether in directly economic or in primarily political form- in the course of the given society’s expandoed reproduction. Once, however, this dynamic process of expansion and accumulation gets stuck (for whatever reason) the consequences must be quite devastating. For even under the ‘normality’ of relatively limited cyclic disturbances and blockages the destruction that goes with the ensuing socioeconomic and political crises can be enormous, as the annals of the twentieth century reveal it, including two world wars (not to mention numerous smaller conflagrations). It is therefore not too difficult to imagine the implications of a systemic, truly structural crisis; i.e. one that affects the global capital system not simply under one if its aspects-the financial/monetary one, for instance-but in all its fundamental dimensions, questioning its viability altogether as a social reproductive system. Under the conditions of capital's structural crisis its destructive constituents come to the fore with a vengeance, activating the spectre of total uncontrollability in a form that foreshadows self-destruction both for this unique social reproductive system itself and for humanity in general. As we shall see in Chapter 3, capital was near amenable to proper and durable control or rational self-restraint. For it was compatible only with limited adjustments, and even those only for as long as it could continue to pursue in one form or another the dynamics of self-expansion and the process of accumulation. Such adjustments consisted in side-stepping, as it were, the encountered obstacles and resistances when capital was unable to frontally demolish them. This characteristic of uncontrollability was in fact one of the most important factors that secured capitals irresistible advancement and ultimate victory, which it had to accomplish despite the earlier mentioned fact that capital's mode of metabolic control constituted the exception and not the rule in history. After all, capital at first appeared as a strictly subordinate force in the course of historical development. And worse still, on account of necessarily subordinating 'use-value' - that is, production for human need - to the requirements of self-expansion and accumulation, capital in all of its forms had to overcome also the odium of being considered for a long time the most 'unnatural' way of controlling the production of wealth. According to the ideological confrontations of medieval times, capital was fatefully implicated in 'mortal sin' in more ways than one, and therefore had to be outlawed as 'heretic' by the highest religious authorities: the Papacy and its Synods. It could not become the dominant force of the social metabolic process before sweeping out of the way the absolute - and religiously sanctified -prohibition on 'usury' (contested under the category of 'profit upon alienation', which really meant: retaining control over the monetary/financial capital of the age, in the interest of the accumulation process, and at the same time securing profit by lending money) and winning the battle over the 'alienability of land' (again, the subject of absolute and religiously sanctified prohibition under the feudal system) without which the emergence of capitalist agriculture -a vital condition for the triumph of the capital system in general would have been quite inconceivable." Thanks to a very large extent to its uncontrollability, capital succeeded in overcoming all odds - no matter how powerful materially and how absolutized in terms of the prevailing value system of society - against itself, elevating its mode of metabolic control to the power of absolute dominance as a fully extended global system. However, it is one thing to overcome and subdue problematical (even obscurantist) constraints and obstacles, and quite another to institute the positive principles of sustainable social development, guided by the criteria of humanly fulfilling objectives, as opposed to the blind pursuit of capital's self-expansion. Thus the implications of the selfsame power of uncontrollability which in its time secured the victory of the capital system are far from reassuring today when the need for restraints is conceded - at least in the form of the elusive desideratum of 'self-regulation' - even by the system's most uncritical defenders.

  1. The Alternative – Reject the affirmative in order to radically resist capitalism through a process of revolutionary persuasion. The “realistic proposals” of the 1ac cannot provide a systemic alternative to the capitalist political framework inherent in the plan. This debate is the key cite of resistance – our ability to use persuasion and show the “antagonism between capitalism and the environment” is unique to starting a revolution.
Wallis, Professor at UC Berkeley, PhD. at Columbia U., 08
(Victor Wallis, Liberal Arts Professor at UC Berkeley, PhD. at Columbia U, November 2008: The Monthly Review “Capitalist and Socialist Responses to the Ecological Crisis” 081103wallis.php)
  1. Where the private and the civic dimensions would merge would be in developing a full-scale class analysis of responsibility for the current crisis and, with it, a movement which could pose a systemic alternative. The steps so far taken in this direction have been limited. Exposés like Gore’s have called attention, for example, to the role of particular oil companies in sponsoring attacks on scientific findings related to climate change, but the idea that there could be an antagonism between capitalism and the environment as such has not yet made its way into general public debate. Until this happens, the inertial impact of the prevailing ideology will severely limit the scope of any concrete recuperative measures.37 The situation is comparable to that surrounding any prospective revolution: until a certain critical point has been reached, the only demands that appear to have a chance of acceptance are the “moderate” ones. But what makes the situation revolutionary is the very fact that the moderate or “realistic” proposals will not provide a solution. What gives these proposals a veneer of reasonableness is no more than their acceptability to political forces which, while unable to design a response commensurate with the scale of the problem, have not yet been displaced from their positions of power. But this very inability on the part of those forces is also an expression of their weakness. They sit precariously atop a process they do not understand, whose scope they cannot imagine, and over which they can have no control. (Or, if they do sense the gravity of the situation, they view it with a siege mentality, seeking above all to assure their own survival.38) At this point, it is clear that the purchase on “realism” has changed hands. The “moderates,” with their relentless insistence on coaxing an ecological cure out of a system inherently committed to trampling everything in its path, have lost all sense of reality. The question now becomes whether the hitherto misgoverned populace will be prepared to push through the radical measures (by now clearly the only realistic ones) or whether its members will have remained so encased within the capitalist paradigm that the only thing they can do is to try—following the cue of those who plunged us all into this fix—to fend individually for themselves. This is the conjuncture that all our efforts have been building for; it will provide the ultimate test of how well we have done our work. In order for the scope of the needed measures to be grasped by sufficient numbers of people, an intense level of grassroots organizing will already have to be underway. However, the measures themselves, if they are to accomplish their purpose, will have to advance further the very process that put them on the agenda to begin with. A characteristically revolutionary mix of persuasion and coercion will necessarily apply—the balance of these two methods depending partly on the effectiveness of prior consciousness-raising and partly on the window of time available for the required steps. No dimension of life will be untouched. From our present vantage point we can only begin to envisage the specific changes, which will primarily involve a reversal or undoing of the more wasteful and harmful structures bequeathed by prior development. Fortunately, however, it will not be a matter of starting from scratch. Many historical lessons have already been learned, and not all of them are of things to avoid. There are positive models as well.

Text: The United States Congress should repeal the Hyde Amendment and guarantee full federal funding for abortions.
Only Congressional Action sends the message that spurs social changes, Supreme Court decision fail
Stoddard, prof law NYU, 97
(Thomas B. Stoddard, Former Professor of Law at NYU Law School, November 1997, New York University Law Review, “Bleeding Heart: Reflection on Using Law to Make Social Change,” pg. 7, downloads/law_downloads/ Stoddard.pdf) [Dan Li]

Let me also suggest this: the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has had such a powerful cultural impact not just because of what it said, but also because of how it came into being. The Act was the product of a continuing passionate and informal national debate of at least a decade's duration (beginning, vaguely, with the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education invalidating the concept of "separate but equal" in the public schools) over the state of race relations in the United States. The debate took place every day and every night in millions of homes, schools, and workplaces. It is this debate--not the debate in the Congress--that really made the Act a reform capable of moral force. Through a continuing national conversation about race, ordinary citizens (especially white citizens) came to see the subject of race anew. The arena of change may also have influenced the scope and power of the result. Imagine that the new rules enacted by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had, instead, emanated from a ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court. (Such a decision, even under the Warren Court, would have seemed unlikely, but not completely implausible. The Court could arguably have relied on a Thirteenth Amendment theory, because the Thirteenth Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, is not limited in scope to state action, [FN19] or it could have turned alternatively to the principle relied on by the Court in Shelley v. Kraemer [FN20] to invalidate restrictive covenants in housing--the idea that the government must not be an accessory to private discriminatory schemes.) Imagine further no substantial difference between the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as enacted and the holdings of one or several hypothetical decisions from the Supreme Court. Would American history have evolved in the same way? Would the difference in the forum of decision making have resulted in a different public reaction to the new rules of law? I think history would have been different. The new rules of law were widely disliked, especially by whites in the South, but the opponents of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 never rose in rebellion, either formal or informal, against enforcement of the statute. If the new rules had come down from on high from the Supreme Court, many Americans would have probably considered the change of law illegitimate, high-handed, and undemocratic--another act of arrogance by the nine philosopher-kings sitting on the Court. Because the change emanated from Congress, however, such sentiments of distrust (whether grounded in principle or in simple racism) never came to affect the legitimacy of this stunning change in American law and mores. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 came into being because a majority of the members of the national legislature believed it represented sound policy and would improve the life of the country's citizens as a whole; the ideas motivating the Act must therefore have validity behind them. In general, then, not only did the historical fact of the continuing national debate on race facilitate the public's acceptance of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, even in the South, but so did the additional (I believe crucial) fact that the change came through legislative consideration rather than judicial or administrative fiat--lending it "culture-shifting" as well as "rule-shifting" power. [FN21] The astonishing effectiveness of the Civil Rights Act of 1964--the breathtaking sweep of its cultural tailcoats--suggests that it should be a model for social change in other settings. It also indicates that how change is made matters almost as much as what is, in the end, done.

The judicial process stops progressivism which leads to oppression, only congressional action avoids this: this evidence assumes all of their courts are progressive arguments
West, prof law Georgetown, 93
(Robin West, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Fall 1993, Northwestern Law Review, pg. 241) [Dan Li]

The first reason is, loosely, historical: the "adjudicated Constitution," by which I mean the Constitution that has been construed and applied by the courts, has proven to be a markedly conservative foundational document, and for that reason alone, a rule of restraint looks desirable. More often than not, our adjudicated Constitution has served to protect existing distributions of social, economic, racial, sexual, linguistic, and cultural power against serious threat of change. It has done so by insulating the private, social, economic, and intimate spheres of life, constituted in part by gross inequities of resources and maldistributions of power, against legislative attempts at redistribution or renegotiation of the terms of private, social, or economic struggle. That foundational conservatism is evidenced not only by the Lochner-era Court's substantive Due Process Clause, Contract Clause, and Takings Clause jurisprudence, which insulated economic hierarchies from redistributive legislative attack, but also by the modern Scalia Court's understanding of the Equal Protection Clause, which insulates racial hierarchies from progressive state legislative attack, and the same Court's interpretation of the First Amendment, which insulates cultural hierarchies from legislative renegotiation through hate speech ordinances. Although the adjudicated Constitution obviously has from time to time been used to effectuate progressive gains and to solidify progressive victories, those moments have been rare, anomalous, and often fleeting: the victory has been, as often as not, soured by near instantaneous conservative reconstruction. For the most part, the clauses of the adjudicated Constitution have operated in concert to conserve present distributions of social, economic, and private power against legislative and democratic attempts at redistributing those resources or renegotiating the terms of struggle. If for no other than that reason, progressives would be well advised to break their romance with the United States Constitution. If it is true, as I have suggested, that the adjudicated Constitution is doctrinally and substantively more of a bar to than a vehicle for progressive legislation, then Thayer's rule looks attractive indeed.

Progressive politics checks the threat of proliferation, terrorism, and wars
The Congressional Progressive Caucus, 03
(The Congressional Progressive Caucus, largest non party Congressional Caucus, 2003, Progressive State of the Union 2003, “While Bush Prepares the US for War, the Congressional Progressive Caucus Presents an Alternative for the American People,”
“On America in the World,” progstate.html) [Dan Li]

Preemptive war doctrine: The administration has come up with a new doctrine, known as "preemptive war," that puts the countries of the world on notice that they may be invaded by US forces at any time, for any reason the administration deems appropriate. Further, the administration announced that the US would use nuclear weapons, even against an adversary that did not possess nuclear weapons of its own. Progressives know that "preemptive war" and "nuclear first strike" doctrines are dangerous for our security. These policies goad countries to prepare for potential US attacks with nuclear weapons of their own, as North Korea has recently demonstrated. Preemptive war and nuclear first strike policies are also illegal. They were made illegal by treaties the US has committed to. Furthermore, "preemptive war" and nuclear first strike are shameful and un-American. Treaties: The administration turned the US into the first country to unilaterally withdraw from a nuclear weapons control (ABM) treaty. Progressives believe that weapons treaties serve our security. The administration should have known that by unilaterally abrogating a nuclear arms control treaty, it would tempt other countries to do the same, as obviously happened in North Korea. Iraq: The administration has claimed that Iraq poses a threat to the US and has ignored the potential of war against Iraq to endanger stability in the region and put our allies at risk. Progressives in Congress believe that war in Iraq is unjustified. The US should allow UN inspectors to complete their inspections and dismantle any existing Iraqi weapons capacity. 9/11: The administration has squandered international support for the US following the attacks by repeatedly using discredited reports of a connection between Iraq and the 9/11 leaders to justify war against Iraq. Progressives believe that the administration has misdirected America's efforts: A war in Iraq distracts America from finding the specific individuals who plotted the 9/11 attacks.

Judicial Legitimacy DA
A. The court’s decision to uphold the voting rights act in a narrow ruling resulted in legitimacy

Los Angeles Times 6/23
(The LA times “Voting Rights Act is upheld ;The Supreme Court leaves safeguards intact while allowing some municipalities to seek exemptions. June 23, 2009 Lexis)

The historic Voting Rights Act -- the 1965 law that ended a century of racial discrimination at the ballot box and gave blacks a political voice across the South -- survived a strong challenge at the Supreme Court on Monday as justices pulled back from a widely anticipated decision to strike down a key part of the law as outdated and unfair to today's South. Instead, the justices agreed to narrow the law's impact by allowing municipalities with a clean record to seek an exemption. Though the court sided with the Texas water district that brought the case, its 8-1 decision preserved the core of the Voting Rights Act, including its special scrutiny for any changes in election rules by Southern states. The ruling also protected the Roberts court from charges of conservative "judicial activism" in its refusal to tamper with an act of Congress, a often sensitive procedure fraught with political risk. Monday's decision, considered among the most important of the term, came as a surprise and a relief to civil rights advocates.

B. The intricacies of abortion means it will always be controversial

Graber, 96 (Mark, Professor of Law and Government @ U Maryland, Rethinking Abortion: Equal Choice, the Constitution, and Reproductive Politics, 38)
Nevertheless, the main rhetorical obstacles pro-choice, pro-life, and anti-Roe advocates face are substantive, not stylistic. No argument at the present time, even one crafted by the most eloquent presidential speech writer or the most sophisticated political advertising agency, is likely to persuade a substantial majority of citizens that basic principles of philosophical or constitutional justice provide clear answers to questions about abortion rights and policies. The foundational values of pro-choice, pro-life, and anti-Roe position all enjoy broad popular support and all are deeply towed in the American political and constitutional tradition Americans cannot reach a consensus on abortion policy because they cannot choose among those values when they conflict.'" The clash of absolutes—fetal life versus procreative choice, written versus living constitutions, and democracy versus judicial review--is, in the view of many citizens, philosophically, constitutionally, and democratically unresolvable.
C. Ruling against the public crushes legitimacy

Yoo, Law @ Berkley, ‘1
(Yoo 2k1, John , Professor, Law at University of California, Berkeley, “In Defense of the Courts’ Legitimacy, 68 U Chi. L. Rev. 775, Lexis)
How does the Court maintain this legitimacy? According to the Casey plurality, the Court receives its public support by "making legally principled decisions under circumstances in which their principled character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the Nation." n39 In other words, only by acting in a manner that suggests that its decisions are the product of law rather than politics can the Court maintain its legitimacy. Therefore, the Court must adhere to settled precedent, lest the public believe that the Court is merely just another political actor. "To overrule under fire in the absence of the most compelling reason to reexamine a watershed decision would subvert the Court's legitimacy beyond any serious question." n40 Without this legitimacy, the Court would be unable to perform its role as interpreter of the Constitution, which at times may require the Court to act against the popular will in favor of individual rights. Leading social scientists appear to agree with the Casey plurality's notion of judicial legitimacy. The Court's institutional legitimacy both enhances the legitimacy of particular decisions and increases the voluntarily acceptance of unpopular decisions. n41 Valuable as it is, however, legitimacy is hard to come by. Political scientists have emphasized the limited ability of the federal courts to enforce their decisions, and hence have turned to the Court's legitimacy as an explanation for compliance. n42 The Court's standing is further complicated because it lacks any electoral basis for its legitimacy. n43 The way to acquire this legitimacy, many scholars seem to believe, is for the Court to appear to act neutrally, n44 objectively, n45 or fairly n46 by following standards of procedural justice or by making decisions that follow principled rules.

D. Legitimacy key to rule of law, rights, and democracy.

Peretti 1999
(Terri J., In Defense of a Political Court, Princeton University Press)

Should the Court lose its legitimacy and, consequently, its power, we in turn lose the benefits that only the Court can provide. Vitally important constitutional rights and liberties, as well as minority groups, would be unprotected and would likely suffer at the hands of an indifferent or hostile majority. An additional loss of paramount importance is the ideal and the reality of the rule of law. All government action would be reduced to arbitrary will and force, rather than being justified according to reason and, thus, rendered legitimate. The consequences of the Court losing its legitimacy and the ability to play its specialized role, if we are to believe Philip Kurland, are horrible indeed.

E) The impact is extinction.
Diamond 95
(Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution senior fellow, co-editor of the Journal of Democracy, December 1995, A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, “Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives,” __ ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm__)
OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically “cleanse” their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

Casey uses equal protection to allow abortion access and will expand rights in its next case
Daly, Widener Law Professor of Law Associate Dean of Faculty Research and Development, 95

The Court's most recent effort to clarify the abortion issue was in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, where it upheld some of the nation's most restrictive abortion provisions.11 Casey is a remarkably splintered and confusing opinion, despite its lofty overture that "[l]iberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt."12 The lead opinion is so fractured that, as the maze of concurrences and dissents illustrate,13 there is something in it for everyone to hate. Indeed, Casey has received almost nothing but criticism: pro-lifers have derided its continued protection of abortion, while pro-choicers have lamented its support of significant abortion restrictions.14 Furthermore, both advocates and detractors of judicial restraint have reproached the Court for simultaneously reaffirming and gutting Roe. Nonetheless, Casey contains the seeds of many positive developments and could signal the approach of a new phase in the Court's abortion jurisprudence. Its most significant contribution may be to broaden the scope of what is considered relevant to the abortion issue. In several important ways, the lead opinion in Casey seems to recognize that abortion is much more than a medical decision affecting people who can only be characterized as patients and implicating a narrow and precarious privacy interest.17 Casey considers the effects of abortion restrictions not just on those in immediate need of abortion-related services but on all women who assume control over reproduction in planning their lives.18 It also recognizes that reproductive rights implicate all aspects of women's social and economic lives and that a state's effort to pigeonhole women impinges on their right to liberty not just to privacy.19 Furthermore, Casey suggests that if such burden is not equally borne by men, it violates women's rights to equal protection because it impedes "the full emancipation of women."20 Thus, the treatment of the abortion issue in Casey represents an understanding of the complexity of the issue that was lacking in prior decisions and it is the first case to evince enough respect for women to warrant application of equal protection principles. The language in Casey creates the hope and the promise of a legal doctrine that reflects this more comprehensive and realistic vision. It is critical to emphasize at the outset, however, that this promise is not fulfilled in four of the five holdings of Casey that uphold the restrictions. The Court has not granted certiorari in any challenge to abortion restrictions since it decided Casey more than three years ago and it appears unlikely that the present Court will revisit the issue in the immediate future.22 The Court, however, is not likely to stay away from the abortion cases for long. When it finally does turn its attention again to abortion, it should rely on the language in Casey to integrate equal protection analysis into its approach to create a more sensible abortion jurisprudence for the 1990s and beyond than it was able to create in the 1970s and 1980s.

  1. Ideology dominates precedent – no spillover.
Songer, University of South Carolina, 99
(Donald R. Songer, University of South Carolina, December 1999, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 93, No. 4) SS

The primary focus of Majority Rule is an empirical test of whether the votes of Supreme Court justices are determined by the Court's own precedent or reflect their ideological preferences. "Does precedent actually cause justices to reach decisions that they otherwise would not have made" (p. 7)? The authors conceptualize this question as involving a dichotomous choice. They assume that a vote is determined solely by either precedent or judicial ideology. They do not attempt to test whether, and do not even allow the possibility that, the votes and policies adopted by the justices can be jointly influenced by both. Analysis centers on the behavior of justices in cases labelled the "progeny" of earlier cases that set precedent. The assumption is that, if the Legal Model is accurate, votes in these progeny cases should be controlled by the parent case. Only the progeny votes of justices who dissented in the precedent case are examined, as one can make no firm conclusions about the motivations of the justices who were part of the majority in the precedent. In the case of those who dissented in the precedent, it may objectively be determined that the precedent was contrary to their ideological prefer- ences. Thus, their votes in the progeny can be classified "objectively" as supporting either precedent or their prefer- ences. Spaeth and Segal examine all the votes of the dissenters in all the orally argued progeny of the universe of a list of the "landmark" decisions of the Court and a sample of the nonunanimous "ordinary" decisions of the Court. In all, 2,425 votes cast by 77 justices in the 1,206 progeny of 341 precedential cases are examined. The conclusions of the authors are unambiguous and can be easily summarized: "The justices are rarely influenced by stare decisis" (p. 288). In only 11.9% of the votes did Spaeth and Segal find any evidence that the justices were influenced by precedent. Moreover, the domination of precedent by the ideological preferences of the justices was found in every era of the Court's history and characterized voting in the progeny of both the landmark and the ordinary cases.

  1. Alt Cause to tanking Human Rights Credibility – Detention Center Health
HRW, Human Rights Watch, 09
(HRW, Human Rights Watch, March 2009, “Detained and Dismissed: Women’s Struggles to Obtain Health Care in United States Immigration Detention,” default/files/reports/ wrd0309web_0.pdf) SS

VI. Legal Standards: International Legal Standards Failures in the detention medical care system’s response to women’s health concerns implicate fundamental human rights, including international legal protections for the right to health, the right to non-discrimination, and the rights of detained persons. A number of these protections are enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention against Torture, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, treaties which the US has ratified. The right to health itself is articulated in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which the US has signed but not yet ratified.

  1. The privacy doctrine better for abortion rights than Equal Protection.
Mentone, Fordham University School of Law, 02
(Kristina M. Mentone, Fordham University School of Law, May 2002, “When Equal Protection Fails: How the Equal Protection Justification for Abortion Undercuts the Struggle for Equality in the Workplace, publications/articles/ 500flspub11453.pdf) SS

Ronald Dworkin supports the privacy argument for abortion and believes that the "right of procreative autonomy follows from any competent interpretation of the due process clause and of the Supreme Court's past decisions applying it.” Dworkin argues that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment selects certain freedoms, such as the freedom to procure an abortion, and makes them specific constitutional rights that a state cannot restrict or override unless it has a compelling reason for doing so. According to his reasoning, abortion rights are safeguarded by the right to privacy, which is inherent in the concept of ordered liberty and personal autonomy. The decision to procure an abortion is at least as private as decisions involving contraception, and decisions involving contraception have been protected under the theory of privacy. Dworkin further explains that the right to an abortion is a necessary component of autonomy. "[Integrity demands general recognition of the principle of procreative autonomy, and therefore of the right of women to decide for themselves not only whether to conceive but whether to bear a child." Abortion "involves a woman's control not just of her sexual relations, but [also] of changes within her own body."

  1. Individual freedom must come first or women will be reduced to the value of their ovaries
Jamieson, Director, Pace Center, Lecturer in Politics, 01
(Beth Kiyoko Jamieson, A.B. Bryn Mawr College, Ph.D. Rutgers University, 2001, Real Choices Feminism, Freedom, and the Limits of Law pg 31-32)
The third way to liberty is treated in feminist scholarship seems, in comparison, quite mild. For some theorist, discussing liberty means addressing primarily reproductive rights. That is a laudable project – but it is not enough. Many scholars seem to assume that assuring policies protecting reproductive freedoms is tantamount to assuring that women are free. They assume women can be free if we merely have sovereignty over all decisions regarding the procreative capacities of our bodies. This is not the case. Liberty encompasses more than just reproductive freedom. The rights to control our sexuality and our bodies are central to women’s freedom, but they are not fully coincident. Although some theorist, who see gender as the prism through which all truth shines, would disagree, I believe that liberty is both broader than and conceptually prior to decisions about reproductive rights. Reproductive freedom that occurs prior to individual freedom reduces women primarily to the value of our ovaries. In contrast, notions of liberty that begin with equal moral personhood and encompass reproductive freedom (as well as freedoms of thought, expression, association, and so on) reflect the complexity of individuals and the connections among bodies, hearts, and minds. We must be free people before we can freely control the means and ends of our reproductive capabilities.
  1. Turn: Access to abortion hurts autonomy
Denbow, J.D., U.C. Berkeley, B.S. (Philosophy, minors in Mathematics & Physics), University of Michigan, 05
(Jennifer Denbow, 2005, Abortion: When Choice and Autonomy Conflict, 2005, Berkeley Journal of Gender, Law, and Justice)
The theoretical framework of choice described by Velleman has implications for the abortion debate, particularly for the pro-choice argument that a woman’s autonomy is enhanced by affording her the right to choose whether or not to have an abortion. It is undeniable that the opportunity to have an abortion will enhance the autonomy of those women with unplanned pregnancies who are open to the idea of abortion and face no pressure to abort. However, for women who would have preferred the previous status quo of birth and who face pressure to abort, the availability of a choice will decrease and afford less respect to their effective autonomies. An extreme example that demonstrates this point is the case of a pregnant indigent woman who is in an abusive relationship with a man on whom she is financially dependent. Her partner does not want a child, but she wants to bring the pregnancy to term and raise the child. This case can be analyzed in the context of the theoretical framework of choice outlined by Velleman to show precisely how a choice can be harmful. This particular woman’s option to end her pregnancy exposes her to pressure from both her partner and society, which can consequently serve to undermine her autonomy.

  1. The affirmative can’t solve for reproductive rights until the issue of women being able to afford raising a child is addressed. Women in poverty would be pressured to choose abortion rather than be able to raise a family.
  2. Harassment means women won’t get abortions
Henshaw, writer at the Alan Guttmacher Institute, 98
(Stanley Henshaw, The New Civil War, Edited by Linda J. Beckman and S. Marie Harvey 1998)

Another barrier vacing many women seeking abortion services is harassment by antiabortion protestors, which also affects the ability of facilities to offer services. Providers were asked to indicate the number of times they had experienced various types of harassment during 1992. In all, 55% of nonhospital providers reported at least one type of harassment during 1992. Harassment was strongly associated with the abortion caseload; 86% of facilities that performed 400 or more abortions in 1992 reported some harassment, compared with only 29% of smaller providers. Harassment varied by region of the country, the Midwest reporting the highest level and the West the lowest. In the Midwest, 48% of the larger clinics (nonhospital providers of 400 or more abortions during 1992) experienced 4 or more types of harassment, compared with 22% of those in the West. The experience of larger providers is shown in Table 5. Picketing, the most common type of harassment was reported by 83% of the larger providers (those performing 400 or more abortions in 1992). Demonstrations resulting in arrests were reported by 34% of these clinics, almost the same number that reported blockades (30%). When nonhospital providers were asked for a list of problems that had affected their ability to provide abortion services during the previous 12 months, 30% cited conditions directly associated with harassment as their most important problem, and an additional 11% mentioned physician shortage and other staffing problems that may have been indirectly related to harassment.

  1. Funding doesn’t change the availability of abortion clinics and doctors willing to perform abortion
Beckman, California school of Professional Psychology, Pacific Institute for Women's Health, Bird, Center for the Study of Women in Society, University of Oregon, Pacific Institute for Women's Health, and Harvey, Center for the Sutdy of Women in Society, University of Oregon, Eugene; Pacific Institute for Women's Health, 98
(Linda Beckman, Sheryl Bird, S. Marie Harvey, The New Civil War, Edited by Linda J. Beckman and S. Marie Harvey1998 pg 370-374)
Access to safe, legal abortion services decreases maternal morbidity and mortality and improves the quality of life for American women and their families (Tietze, 1984). In addition, when abortion is legal and accessible, infant mortality rates decline. This decline results from the prevention of unwanted pregnancies and a decrease in births of infants with major physical or mental defects (Corman Gt Grossman, 1984). Thus, ensuring that women have access to safe and legal abortion services is of paramount importance. The United States has, however, recently experienced a significant decline in the availability and accessibility of abortion services. Henshaw’s findings (chap. 3) indicate that the declining number of abortion providers as well as the changes in geographic concentration and types of providers negatively impact service availability. Several strategies could increase the number and geographic distribution of abortion providers and services. As discussed by Masho, Coeytaux, and Potts (cha 15), abortion training needs to be a required component in medical school curricula. Similarly, training of already practicing health care providers is essential. Yet, in recent years the number of residency programs that offer abortion training has decreased substantially, and only 12% of the obstetric and gynecology residency programs require the procedure (Rosenblatt, Mattis, Sr. Hart, 1995). In addition to targeting obstetricians and gynecologists, training physicians in family practice and primary care would help address the shortage of abortion providers. Moreover, access could be significantly increased by eliminating legal restrictions if that prevent other groups of licensed health care providers (eg., nurse practitioners, nurse midwives, and physician assistants) from performing abortions. Abortion services have long been kept at the fringes of American medical care. Abortion practice must be brought into the mainstream of if medical care with such services available in the same facilities as other reproductive health care (Henshaw, chap. 3; Radford St Shaw, 1993).