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T – Increase is not removing a barrier
A. Increase is direct growth not removing a barrier
Random House Webster’s College Dictionary 96

Increase: 1)to make greater, as in number, size, strength, or quality; augment 2)to become greater, as in number, size, strength, or quality 3)to multiply by propagation 4)growth or augmentation in size, strength, quality 5)the act or process of increasing


B) Violation: the aff does not increase funding for abortion through Medicaid they just overturn a court case that prevents funding
C) Standards:
1. Limits: they're only effectually topical their interp allows removing literally any barrier this opens the floodgates and overstretches our research burden
2. Predictability: they force us to prepare by looking to their solvency by having a plan text with no resolutional basis.
3. Topic-specific education: under their interpretation of debate, we never discuss the resolutional but instead a number of unrelated steps.
D) Evaluate T in a framework of competing interpretations; if we win that our interpretation is best for debate, you vote them down. Reasonability is arbitrary and mandates judge intervention.
E) FX:T is an independent voting issue for education and fairness
F) T is a voter for our standards and jurisdiction.

Congress CP 1NC (1/2)
Text: The United States Congress should repeal the Hyde Amendment and guarantee full federal funding for abortions.
Only Congressional Action sends the message that spurs social changes, Supreme Court decision fail
Stoddard, prof law NYU, 97
(Thomas B. Stoddard, Former Professor of Law at NYU Law School, November 1997, New York University Law Review, “Bleeding Heart: Reflection on Using Law to Make Social Change,” pg. 7, http://law.ubalt.edu/law/ downloads/law_downloads/ Stoddard.pdf) [Dan Li]

Let me also suggest this: the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has had such a powerful cultural impact not just because of what it said, but also because of how it came into being. The Act was the product of a continuing passionate and informal national debate of at least a decade's duration (beginning, vaguely, with the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education invalidating the concept of "separate but equal" in the public schools) over the state of race relations in the United States. The debate took place every day and every night in millions of homes, schools, and workplaces. It is this debate--not the debate in the Congress--that really made the Act a reform capable of moral force. Through a continuing national conversation about race, ordinary citizens (especially white citizens) came to see the subject of race anew. The arena of change may also have influenced the scope and power of the result. Imagine that the new rules enacted by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had, instead, emanated from a ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court. (Such a decision, even under the Warren Court, would have seemed unlikely, but not completely implausible. The Court could arguably have relied on a Thirteenth Amendment theory, because the Thirteenth Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, is not limited in scope to state action, [FN19] or it could have turned alternatively to the principle relied on by the Court in Shelley v. Kraemer [FN20] to invalidate restrictive covenants in housing--the idea that the government must not be an accessory to private discriminatory schemes.) Imagine further no substantial difference between the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as enacted and the holdings of one or several hypothetical decisions from the Supreme Court. Would American history have evolved in the same way? Would the difference in the forum of decision making have resulted in a different public reaction to the new rules of law? I think history would have been different. The new rules of law were widely disliked, especially by whites in the South, but the opponents of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 never rose in rebellion, either formal or informal, against enforcement of the statute. If the new rules had come down from on high from the Supreme Court, many Americans would have probably considered the change of law illegitimate, high-handed, and undemocratic--another act of arrogance by the nine philosopher-kings sitting on the Court. Because the change emanated from Congress, however, such sentiments of distrust (whether grounded in principle or in simple racism) never came to affect the legitimacy of this stunning change in American law and mores. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 came into being because a majority of the members of the national legislature believed it represented sound policy and would improve the life of the country's citizens as a whole; the ideas motivating the Act must therefore have validity behind them. In general, then, not only did the historical fact of the continuing national debate on race facilitate the public's acceptance of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, even in the South, but so did the additional (I believe crucial) fact that the change came through legislative consideration rather than judicial or administrative fiat--lending it "culture-shifting" as well as "rule-shifting" power. [FN21] The astonishing effectiveness of the Civil Rights Act of 1964--the breathtaking sweep of its cultural tailcoats--suggests that it should be a model for social change in other settings. It also indicates that how change is made matters almost as much as what is, in the end, done.






Congress CP 1NC (2/2)
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the authority to address equal protection violations.
West, 5 (Robin, What Roe v. Wade Should Have Said, edited by Jack M. Balkin, pg. 138) SS
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly delegates to Congress the authority to pass necessary legislation should states violate Section 5 of that Amendment by denying individuals equal protection of the law or by failing to protect them against deprivations of their liberty, life, and property without due process of law. If a state's actions, or a state's laws, or a state's failure to take action, or a state's failure to pass laws violate citizens' rights to equal protection or liberty, then Congress is empowered to respond. It has both the explicit power to do so, under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the implicit responsibility to do so. Ideally, then, it is Congress, not this Court, that should respond to unconstitutional legal regimes such as those put in place in Texas and Georgia with respect to abortion. This Court should accord Congress considerable deference, "when and if Congress acts so as to ameliorate or address unconstitutional conditions brought on by these state laws or any other. The power to take action so as to remedy constitutional violations brought on by state law must obviously include, as well, the authority to interpret the meaning of the constitutional mandate that has been violated. One cannot possibly enforce what one cannot interpret.

Congress Legitimacy Net Benefit (1/2)
Only the counterplan restores Congress to its legitimate role as a political actor. Using the courts or any combination of the courts/congress renders Congress insignificant.
West, Prof Law Georgetown, 06
(Robin West, Professor of Law, Georgetown University, 12-4-06, “The Constitution's Political Deficit,” Harvard Law and Policy Review, Online http://www.hlpronline.com/ 2006/07/west_01.html) SS

Second: these constitutional questions, precisely because they are constitutional, become, by virtue of the "legal" status of the United States Constitution, questions of "law."__4__ A "constitutional question" is a "legal" question - not a political or moral question about governance. So, questions regarding whether or not a state might constitutionally criminalize abortion, hate speech, and so forth, or whether a state might be constitutionally required to provide for welfare or gun control, become, by virtue of this second transformation, questions about the content and meaning of our law. Third and finally, given the legacy of legal realism, these legal questions in turn become questions about what courts will and will not do: what they understand the law to be and how they will likely decide the question, should it be presented them. Thus, by this three-fold conflation, questions that on first framing were moral or political questions about good governance - Should states criminalize this, that or the other? Do states have obligations to the needy? Should executives have a certain sort of power? - become purely legal questions about court decisions. Political questions become, through constitutionalism, questions about judicial behavior. I have argued elsewhere that this is very bad for the content of our constitutional law,__5__ but what I want to urge here is that the "legal question doctrine" thus understood also occasions a serious "political deficit." Real moral inquiry into the nature of good governance happens in courts of law, rather than in political fora. Politics, as Aristotle envisioned, should consist of ethical reasoning among equal human beings about how to govern themselves. Understood as such, politics, practiced well, is the highest, most ennobling, most serious form of practical human reasoning that exists. But over the course of the last century, in an almost uninterrupted trajectory, we have delegated this serious, moral, ennobling work of political activity among and between political equals to the courts. And what has been the consequence? We have a library full of a hundred years of judicial reasoning, argument, and deliberation - some ennobling, some of it awfully pompous, and some just embarrassing - on the meaning of liberty, equality, democracy, and so forth. Meanwhile, Congress, a political branch, withers not so much from corruption, as from disuse. The Court reasons, ideally and occasionally, in an Aristotelian spirit: with its eye on liberty and equality, among equals, at least on the Court. The Congress, by contrast, merely acts - motivated by whimsy or by passion, for good reasons, bad reasons, or no reasons. This allocation of labor -- the Court engages in ennobling moral reasoning about good government and therefore in the philosophical and moral arts of politics, while the Congress does nothing but act, on the basis of its own or constituent "preferences" - occasions what I am calling the "political deficit." The "legal question doctrine" transforms political questions about the nature of good governance into legal questions. The work remaining for the political branch? Horse trading at best. True politics has been given over to courts.


Congress Legitimacy Net Benefit (2/2)
Ignoring Congress in aspects of moral politics denies Congress, legitimacy leading to extinction.
West, Prof Law Georgetown, 06
(Robin West, Professor of Law, Georgetown University, 12-4-06, “The Constitution's Political Deficit,” Harvard Law and Policy Review, Online http://www.hlpronline.com/ 2006/07/west_01.html) SS

Although this might initially seem paradoxical, the combination of what Levinson calls the "democratic deficit" and what I am calling the "political deficit" inherent in U.S. constitutional law and practice lends aid, from time to time in our history, to profoundly lawless, asocial and destructive impulses. By so denigrating the law-maker, we denigrate her product, which is ordinary law. Thus, the "legal deficit." Of course, our constitutional text and practice have, on a handful of important occasions, given "constitutional" comfort to a highly principled natural law. In such cases, text and practice have been a friend and ally to moral and righteous civil disobedience against unjust majoritarian inclinations, as expressed in morally noxious and politically destructive legislative action.__6__ Less remarked upon, however, is that our constitutional practice has also given constitutional comfort to the anti-legalist instincts of a very different and what might be called "hyper-individualist" strand of anti-legalism: a frontier-conquering, gun-wielding, tax-protesting, border-protecting, conception of liberty, which seeks, with constitutional help, to free the individual of all obligations to the social compact, neighbors, states, and even families, much less to the very "beloved community" of which Dr. King so eloquently spoke.__7__ Likewise, these days our anti-legalistic and anti-legislative constitutional practices give aid to the President, who seeks constitutional blessing for his instinct to be freed from ties not only under the domestic law that seeks to constrain his reach, but under international laws, treaties, conventions, and covenants that might do so as well.__8__ The constitutional and, hence, anti-legalist obligations and entitlements of such a commander-in-chief might well "trump" in his own mind and in his office the petty duties of fidelity to ordinary law. We ought to view both phenomena as dangerous. Hyper-individualism can morph into a narcissistic and costly recklessness, just as a militarist executive unleashed from legal bonds, as well as other sorts of bonds that strengthen and recognize our shared humanity, might imperil the planet. A constitutional practice that preaches relentless suspicion of ordinary, voted-upon law, that persistently sees in politics the worst in us, and sees in a document that protects us against our ordinary politics the best of us, winds up casting a pall of potential illegitimacy over the legislative product. Constitutionalism preaches distrust of both majoritarian politics and of its product, ordinary law. This effect of Constitutionalism is what I'm referring to as the "legal deficit."


Court Legitimacy – 1NC (1/2)
A. The court’s decision to uphold the voting rights act in a narrow ruling resulted in legitimacy

Los Angeles Times 6/23
(The LA times “Voting Rights Act is upheld ;The Supreme Court leaves safeguards intact while allowing some municipalities to seek exemptions. June 23, 2009 Lexis)


The historic Voting Rights Act -- the 1965 law that ended a century of racial discrimination at the ballot box and gave blacks a political voice across the South -- survived a strong challenge at the Supreme Court on Monday as justices pulled back from a widely anticipated decision to strike down a key part of the law as outdated and unfair to today's South. Instead, the justices agreed to narrow the law's impact by allowing municipalities with a clean record to seek an exemption. Though the court sided with the Texas water district that brought the case, its 8-1 decision preserved the core of the Voting Rights Act, including its special scrutiny for any changes in election rules by Southern states. The ruling also protected the Roberts court from charges of conservative "judicial activism" in its refusal to tamper with an act of Congress, a often sensitive procedure fraught with political risk. Monday's decision, considered among the most important of the term, came as a surprise and a relief to civil rights advocates.

B. Abortion funding in general is not popular with the public – Mexico City Policy proves.
Susan B. Anthony List, nationwide pro-life network, 09
(Susan B. Anthony List, nationwide pro-life network, 2-3-09, “Obama’s Abortion Funding Decision Least Popular So Far, Gallup Say,” Lexis) SS

"This week's Gallup poll revealed the truth that President Obama 's decision to roll back the commonsense Mexico City Policy is out of step with the attitudes of the majority of American taxpayers," said Susan B. Anthony List President Marjorie Dannenfelser. "Of the top seven Presidential decisions polled by Gallup, President Obama's choice to send taxpayer dollars to overseas abortion providers was by far the least popular. Fifty-eight percent of Americans disapprove of taxpayer-funded subsidies for abortion abroad, and those sentiments extend to funding abortion here at home. I strongly urge President Obama to abandon the radical abortion bailout agenda. Americans want him to endorse policies that actually reduce abortion, not promote it at the taxpayer's expense." The Jan. 30-Feb. 1 USA Today/Gallup poll asked Americans to say whether they approve or disapprove of seven specific actions Obama has taken as president. Of the seven actions, Obama's decision to repeal the Mexico City Policy garnered the highest disapproval ratings at 58%.


C. Ruling against the public crushes legitimacy

Yoo, Law @ Berkley, ‘1
(Yoo 2k1, John , Professor, Law at University of California, Berkeley, “In Defense of the Courts’ Legitimacy, 68 U Chi. L. Rev. 775, Lexis)
How does the Court maintain this legitimacy? According to the Casey plurality, the Court receives its public support by "making legally principled decisions under circumstances in which their principled character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the Nation." n39 In other words, only by acting in a manner that suggests that its decisions are the product of law rather than politics can the Court maintain its legitimacy. Therefore, the Court must adhere to settled precedent, lest the public believe that the Court is merely just another political actor. "To overrule under fire in the absence of the most compelling reason to reexamine a watershed decision would subvert the Court's legitimacy beyond any serious question." n40 Without this legitimacy, the Court would be unable to perform its role as interpreter of the Constitution, which at times may require the Court to act against the popular will in favor of individual rights. Leading social scientists appear to agree with the Casey plurality's notion of judicial legitimacy. The Court's institutional legitimacy both enhances the legitimacy of particular decisions and increases the voluntarily acceptance of unpopular decisions. n41 Valuable as it is, however, legitimacy is hard to come by. Political scientists have emphasized the limited ability of the federal courts to enforce their decisions, and hence have turned to the Court's legitimacy as an explanation for compliance. n42 The Court's standing is further complicated because it lacks any electoral basis for its legitimacy. n43 The way to acquire this legitimacy, many scholars seem to believe, is for the Court to appear to act neutrally, n44 objectively, n45 or fairly n46 by following standards of procedural justice or by making decisions that follow principled rules.


Court Legitimacy – 1NC (2/2)
D. Legitimacy key to rule of law, rights, and democracy.

Peretti 1999
(Terri J., In Defense of a Political Court, Princeton University Press)


Should the Court lose its legitimacy and, consequently, its power, we in turn lose the benefits that only the Court can provide. Vitally important constitutional rights and liberties, as well as minority groups, would be unprotected and would likely suffer at the hands of an indifferent or hostile majority. An additional loss of paramount importance is the ideal and the reality of the rule of law. All government action would be reduced to arbitrary will and force, rather than being justified according to reason and, thus, rendered legitimate. The consequences of the Court losing its legitimacy and the ability to play its specialized role, if we are to believe Philip Kurland, are horrible indeed.





D) The impact is extinction.
Diamond 95
(Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution senior fellow, co-editor of the Journal of Democracy, December 1995, A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, “Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives,” __http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm__)
OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically “cleanse” their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

1NC
A. The affirmative tells the story of power backwards. For them, the imposition of law delimits the possibility of individual self-expression. This only obscures the endless proliferation of identity practices which CONSTITUTE and CREATE social meaning.
Hailing the law as a savior enacts a fundamental limit on the capacity for multiplicity
Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the College De France 1975-1976,2003, p. 265-6
IN ORDER TO MAKE a concrete analysis of power relations, we must abandon the juridical model of sovereignty. That model in effect presupposes that the individual is a subject with natural rights or primitive powers; it sets itself the task of accounting for the ideal genesis of the State; and finally, it makes the law the basic manifestation of power. We should be trying to study power not on the basis of the primitive terms of the relationship, but on the basis of the relationship itself, to the extent that it is the relationship itself that determines the elements on which it bears: rather than asking ideal subjects what part of themselves or their powers they have surrendered in order to let themselves become subjects, we have to look at how relations of subjugation can manufacture subjects. Similarly, rather than looking for the single form or the central point from which all forms of power derive, either by way of consequence or development, we must begin by letting them operate in their multiplicity, their differences, their specificity, and their reversibility; we must therefore study them as relations of force that intersect, refer to one another, converge, or, on the contrary, come into conflict and strive to negate one another. And, finally, rather than privileging the law as manifestation of power, we would do better to try to identify the different techniques of constraint that it implements.
B. This is particularly true with the doctrine of equal protection. The abstract concept of equality when put into practice becomes a tool of normalization and assimilation. By emphasizing the fundamental sameness of disparate classes it erases all the marks of difference which make possible the imagination of bodies distinct from the white, male, high class norm
Kenji Yoshino Yale School of Law. 1998 “Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell".”Yale Law Journal. Volume: 108. Issue: 3.
Covering, rather than conversion or passing, is at issue here. Williams's colleague was not asking her to convert to being white or to pass as white. Rather, he was suggesting that she might cover her blackness by not making "too much of [her] race."(67) That expression is telling--Williams is entitled to her race, but not to "too much" of it; there is a set of unspecified race-related traits that extends beyond the acceptable bounds of black identity. Covering also inheres more subtly in the colleague's wish that the school be able to find "more blacks like"(68) Williams, which, by his own admission, is defined at least in part as a category of persons whom he does not even think of as black. The colleague's statements, while contradictory in the way Williams notes, nonetheless arise from a consistent assumption that there is such a thing as "excessive blackness." That excess both disrupts the relationship he and Williams could otherwise have and disqualifies the other black woman from that relationship. It is this excess, which extends beyond skin color alone, that needs to be covered.(69) All three assimilationist demands inhere in current equal protection doctrine. The demands to convert and to pass are explicitly made in the immutability and visibility factors, respectively. The immutability factor withholds protection from groups that can convert, leaving them susceptible to legislation that pressures them to do so.(70) The visibility factor similarly withholds protection from groups that can hide their defining trait, making them vulnerable to legislation that induces them to pass.(71) In contrast, the demand to cover has a more subtle and pervasive presence in equal protection doctrine. It is not captured in any discrete factor, but rather in a classification-based--as opposed to class-based view of equal protection. A classification-based view of equal protection seeks to treat all classes created by a classification the same, while a class-based--view privileges the disadvantaged class(es) created by a classification. Because it tends to ignore differences between the classes created by a classification, the classification-based view often results in the demand to cover. The ideal of "colorblindness" is perhaps the best example of such a classification-based view. In attempting to be colorblind, the judiciary often garners results that not only ignore the real disparities between whites and blacks but evaluate blacks by implicitly white standards.(72) In order to succeed, blacks are forced to meet those standards, and thereby must mute any cultural and historical differences between whites and blacks. In such a scenario, blacks are not being asked to convert or to pass, but they are being asked to cover.(73)

1NC
The plan rescues agency and human dignity – but it does so at the cost of rendering theme fundamentally alien.
Vote negative to sacrifice this meaning, to give up on agency and to establish the possibility of immanence that stands in stark contrast to the world of biological destiny
Only we access the true internal link to their agency arguments – the degradation of an infinitely valuable self by a world which insists that meaning can be found only in the principle of utility.
Georges Bataille, Theory of Religion, 1992, p. 41-46
The Worker and the Tool. Generally speaking, the world of things is perceived as a fallen world. It entails the alienation of the one who created it. This is the basic principle: to subordinate is not only to alter the subordinated element but to be altered oneself. The tool changes nature and man at the same time: it subjugates nature to man, who makes and uses it, but it ties man to subjugated nature. Nature becomes man’s property but it ceases to be immanent to him. It is his on condition that it is closed to him. If he places the world in his power, this is to the extent that he forgets that he is himself the world: he denies the world but it is himself that he denies. Everything in my power declares that I have compelled that which is equal to me no longer to exist for its own purpose but rather for a purpose that is alien to it. The purpose of a plow is alien to the reality that constitutes it; and with greater reason, the same is true of a grain of wheat or a calf. If I ate the wheat or the calf in an animal way, they would also be diverted from their own purpose, but they would be suddenly destroyed as wheat and as calf. At no time would the wheat and the calf be the things that they are from the start. The grain of wheat is a unit of agricultural production; the cow is a head of livestock, and the one who cultivates the wheat is a farmer; the one who raises the steer is a stock raiser. Now, during the time when he is cultivating, the farmer’s purpose is not his own purpose, and during the time when he is tending stock, the purpose of the stock raiser is not his own purpose. The agricultural product and the livestock are things, and the farmer and the stock raiser during the time they are working, are also things. All this is foreign to the immanent immensity, where there are neither separations nor limits. In the degree that he is the immanent immensity, that he is being, that he is of the world, man is a stranger for himself. The farmer is not a man: he is the plow of the one who eats the bread. At the limit, the act of the eater himself is already agricultural labor, to which he furnishes the energy Chapter III Sacrifice, the Festival, and the Principles of the Sacred World The Need that is Met by Sacrifice and Its Principle The first fruits of the harvest or a head of livestock are sacrificed in order to remove the plant and the animal, together with the farmer and the stock raiser, from the world of things. The principle of sacrifice is destruction, but though it sometimes goes so far as to destroy completely (as in a holocaust), the destruction that sacrifice is intended to bring about is not annihilation. The thing - only the thing - is what sacrifice means to destroy in the victim. Sacrifice destroys an object's real ties of subordination; it draws the victim out of the world of utility and restores it to that of unintelligible caprice. When the offered animal enters the circle in which the priest will immolate it, it passes from the world of things which are closed to man and are nothing to him, which he knows from the outside - to the world that is immanent to it, intimate, known as the wife is known is sexual consumption (consummation charnelle). This assumes that it has ceased to be separated from its own intimacy, as it is in the subordination of labour. The sacrificer's prior separation from the world of thing is necessary for the return to intimacy, of immanence between man and the world, between the subject and the object. The sacrificer needs the sacrifice in order to separate himself from the world of things and the victim could not be separated from it in turn if the sacrificer was not already separated in advance. The sacrificer declares: "Intimately, I belong to the sovereign world of gods and myths, to the world of violent and uncalculated generosity, just as my wife belongs to my desires. I withdraw you, victim, from the world in which you were and could only be reduced to the condition of a thing, having a meaning that was foreign to your intimate nature. I call you back to the intimacy of the divine world, of the profound immanence of all that is." The Unreality of the Divine World Of course this is a monologue and the victim can neither understand nor reply. Sacrifice essentially turns its back on real relations. If it took them into account, it would go against its own nature, which is precisely the opposite of that world of things on which distinct reality is founded. It could not destroy the animal as a thing without denying the animal's objective reality. This is what gives the world of sacrifice an appearance of puerile gratuitousness. But one cannot at the same time destroy the values that found reality and accept their limits. The return to immanent intimacy implies a beclouded consciousness: consciousness is tied to the positing of objects as such, grasped directly, apart from a vague perception, beyond the always unreal images of a thinking based on participation.

1NC
The impact is the endless proliferation of destructive politics. The underside of the right to agency is the biopolitical capacity for absolute state extermination.
The bloodiest wars and the worst atrocities are part and parcel of a concept of social organization which locates power in the capacity for state regulation
James Bernauer, Professor of Philosophy, Boston College, Michel Foucault’s Force of Flight, 1990, p. 141-142
This capacity of power to conceal itself cannot cloak the tragedy of the implications contained in Foucault's examination of its functioning. While liberals have fought to extend rights and Marxists have denounced the injustice of capitalism, a political technology, acting in the interests of a better administration of life, has produced a politics that places man's existence as a living being in question. The very period that proclaimed pride in having overthrown the tyranny of monarchy, that engaged in an endless clamor for reform, that is confident in the virtues of its humanistic faith-this period's politics created a landscape dominated by history's bloodiest wars. What comparison is possible between a sovereign's authority to take a life and a power that, in the interest of protecting a society's quality of life, can plan, as well as develop the means for its implementation, a policy of mutually assured destruction? Such a policy is neither an aberration of the fundamental principles of modern politics nor an abandonment of our age's humanism in favor of a more primitive right to kill; it is but the other side of a Power that is "situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population." The bio-political project of administering and optimizing life closes its circle with the production of the Bomb. "The atomic situation is now at the end point of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of a power to guarantee an individual's continued existence." The solace that might have been expected from being able to gaze at scaffolds empty of the victims of a tyrant's vengeance has been stolen from us by the noose that has tightened around each of our own necks.

Case:
  1. Ideology dominates precedent – no spillover.
Songer, University of South Carolina, 99
(Donald R. Songer, University of South Carolina, December 1999, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 93, No. 4) SS
The primary focus of Majority Rule is an empirical test of whether the votes of Supreme Court justices are determined by the Court's own precedent or reflect their ideological preferences. "Does precedent actually cause justices to reach decisions that they otherwise would not have made" (p. 7)? The authors conceptualize this question as involving a dichotomous choice. They assume that a vote is determined solely by either precedent or judicial ideology. They do not attempt to test whether, and do not even allow the possibility that, the votes and policies adopted by the justices can be jointly influenced by both. Analysis centers on the behavior of justices in cases labelled the "progeny" of earlier cases that set precedent. The assumption is that, if the Legal Model is accurate, votes in these progeny cases should be controlled by the parent case. Only the progeny votes of justices who dissented in the precedent case are examined, as one can make no firm conclusions about the motivations of the justices who were part of the majority in the precedent. In the case of those who dissented in the precedent, it may objectively be determined that the precedent was contrary to their ideological prefer- ences. Thus, their votes in the progeny can be classified "objectively" as supporting either precedent or their prefer- ences. Spaeth and Segal examine all the votes of the dissenters in all the orally argued progeny of the universe of a list of the "landmark" decisions of the Court and a sample of the nonunanimous "ordinary" decisions of the Court. In all, 2,425 votes cast by 77 justices in the 1,206 progeny of 341 precedential cases are examined. The conclusions of the authors are unambiguous and can be easily summarized: "The justices are rarely influenced by stare decisis" (p. 288). In only 11.9% of the votes did Spaeth and Segal find any evidence that the justices were influenced by precedent. Moreover, the domination of precedent by the ideological preferences of the justices was found in every era of the Court's history and characterized voting in the progeny of both the landmark and the ordinary cases.
  1. Alt Cause to tanking Human Rights Credibility – Detention Center Health
HRW, Human Rights Watch, 09
(HRW, Human Rights Watch, March 2009, “Detained and Dismissed: Women’s Struggles to Obtain Health Care in United States Immigration Detention,” http://www.hrw.org/sites/ default/files/reports/ wrd0309web_0.pdf) SS
VI. Legal Standards: International Legal Standards Failures in the detention medical care system’s response to women’s health concerns implicate fundamental human rights, including international legal protections for the right to health, the right to non-discrimination, and the rights of detained persons. A number of these protections are enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention against Torture, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, treaties which the US has ratified. The right to health itself is articulated in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which the US has signed but not yet ratified.